Publications
Kim, Sung Eun, Rebecca Perlman, and Grace Zeng. (2025). “The Politics of Rejection: Explaining Chinese Import Refusals.” American Journal of Political Science, 69, 438-454.
- Health and safety standards offer a convenient means by which governments can credibly claim to be protecting the population, even while pursuing less publicly-oriented goals. In the realm of international trade, such regulatory standards have most often been studied as a method of veiled protectionism that can help nations privilege domestic industry while skirting World Trade Organization requirements of openness. Yet precisely because health and safety standards create ambiguity about their intent and are therefore difficult to punish, nations may be incentivized to use them for goals that extend well beyond protecting domestic industry. In particular, we theorize that governments will, at times, use regulatory barriers as a means of coercive diplomacy. In order to show this, we collect comprehensive data on import refusals by Chinese border inspectors between 2011 and 2019. Though ostensibly intended to keep dangerous products out of the hands of Chinese consumers, we demonstrate that import rejections have systematically been used by the Chinese government as a way to punish states that act against China’s interest.
Working Papers
“Ratcheting up Standards: Multinational Corporations in Global Environmental Governance”
- Multinational corporations (MNCs) play a key role in global environmental governance, yet the precise nature of their influence on international environmental standards remains less understood. I explore the impact of MNC activity and the integration of MNCs in global value chains (GVCs) on global environmental regulation. Using data on MNCs’ cross-border activity and environmental provisions in trade agreements, I find that countries with higher levels of cross-border MNC activity are more likely to “converge up” – they include stronger and more harmonized environmental standards in their international agreements. I argue that this is because MNCs have a preference for “upward converging” standards, which simplify the compliance process and minimize compliance costs. An examination of firms’ written submissions to the United States Trade Representative provides further evidence that MNCs demand upwardly convergent environmental provisions in Free Trade Agreements.
“Breaking the Plastics Supply Chain Coalition: When Firms Support Plastic Regulation”
- Supply chain linkages are widely believed to foster coalitions among firms that share exposure to regulation through upstream inputs and downstream sales. This suggests firms across a supply chain should collectively support or resist regulation. However, in the context of plastic legislation, there is notable variation in firm responses. Policies aimed at reducing plastic use and production impose significant economic costs on firms throughout the plastics supply chain. While some affected firms oppose such regulations, many lobby in favor. What explains this divergence? I argue that two key factors — public attention and a firm’s outside options — drive firms’ varied positions. Consumer-facing firms, which are more vulnerable to reputational risks and consumer pressure, are more likely to support plastics regulation, while firms with limited outside options due to declining demand for their non-plastic products are more likely to oppose it. To test this claim, I analyze public submissions by firms spanning the entire plastics supply chain — from oil drilling and refining to processing, product manufacturing, and waste management — in response to the Environmental Protection Agency’s draft plastic regulation. I find that consumer-facing firms are more likely to support plastic regulation. The finding challenges the notion that supply chain linkages lead to unified firm responses to regulation, demonstrating instead that firms’ regulatory positions are shaped by their exposure to public scrutiny and market alternatives.
“Institutional Constraints and Treaty Continuity”
- Conventional wisdom about international negotiations suggests that global agreements are individually negotiated and distinct, while recent studies find significant levels of similarity among treaties. I show that there is, in fact, notable variation in the extent to which countries recycle the language of past treaties. While some countries constantly adjust the provisions in their preferential trade agreements (PTAs), others conclude highly consistent PTAs with largely unaltered commitments. Understanding what causes treaty continuity is important since unchanging provisions might stall policy innovations and lead to institutional inefficiency. I argue that a country’s institutional constraints strongly affect the degree of continuity in its trade agreements. Countries with higher levels of institutional constraints face a more stringent ratification constraint due to their large number of veto players with heterogeneous preferences. Anticipating this, trade negotiators try to secure ratification by reusing the provisions in existing agreements that are proven acceptable. Using a comprehensive dataset of all PTAs since 1945 and text analysis, I show that countries with higher levels of institutional constraint have concluded more similar treaties over time.